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Reflections on the Post-Partition Period: Life Narratives 
of Kashmiri Muslims in Contemporary Kashmir
This article examines the political subjectivities 
of the first generation of post-Partition 
Kashmiri Muslims and presents their life 
narratives, both written and oral, as an 
important vantage point from which to 
understand shifts in Kashmiri Muslim society 
in the early post-Partition period. It also 
explores how these narratives are mediated 
by the respondent’s present, a period after 
the militancy of the late eighties and nineties, 
but one in which there remains a mass 
uprising against Indian rule. This generation 
was important for a number of reasons. One, 
they witnessed the erosion of Kashmir’s 
autonomy and the promises of a plebiscite, as 
well as intense political repression. Two, they 
were enlisted in the project of state reform 
and nation building, and thus, effectively 
participated in those same processes of 
erosion. As a result, I argue that the conditions 
and uncertainty surrounding the Kashmir 
‘dispute’ led to a political subjectivity that 
sought coherence amidst contradiction and 
incommensurate political and ideological 
commitments. In particular, this coherence was 
reflected in the desire to assert and foreground 
a Kashmiri Muslim identity, one that existed 
alongside other class, regional and gendered 
identities, but was nonetheless sharpened 
as a political community. I conclude with a 
reflection on the importance of this generation 
to understanding the making of political 
subjectivities in Kashmir today. 
Keywords: Kashmir, Muslim, Partition, life narratives, militancy, 
oral history.
Hafsa Kanjwal
HIMALAYA Volume 38, Number 2 |  41
Introduction
A vast majority of Kashmiri Muslims who went to 
India for study, had a sort of hatred for India, but 
the air was so oppressive that they couldn’t express 
it. The Kashmiri educated middle class always lived 
in such a dichotomy. When a Kashmiri Muslim was 
engaged in government service, he was an Indian. 
But at home, he was a Pakistani. He cried if  
Pakistan lost a cricket match, but then when it was 
time to go to office he changed from his pheran1 to 
Western clothes, took dictates from his bosses, and 
somehow became instrumental in suppressing his 
own people (Dr. Mir Nazir Ahmed, former  
Medical Superintendent). 
The above quote illustrates the complex entanglements of 
political ideology, religious identity, and class aspirations 
that defined Kashmiri Muslims in the early post-Partition 
period.2 After the monumental Partition of the Indian 
subcontinent in 1947, Kashmiri Muslims found them-
selves divided between the new nation-states of India and 
Pakistan (Snedden 2012).3 As a separate political commu-
nity that had its own political visions and direction in the 
late colonial period, they did not seamlessly fit into the 
political trajectories of either.4 Those in the Indian-held 
state of Jammu and Kashmir had to deal with multiple 
contradictions and dilemmas. One, as contestations over 
the future of Kashmir still remained unresolved, they 
witnessed the erosion of Kashmir’s autonomy and the 
promises of a United Nations-mandated plebiscite, as well 
as intense political repression. As the Indian government 
sought to stamp out the “provisionality of Kashmir’s 
accession to India”, declaring Kashmir to be an integral 
part of India, political repression was meted out by both 
the central government, as well as the local Kashmiri state 
government (Duschinski, et al., 2018: 15-18).5 The latter 
operated under a veneer of democracy, stifling all dissent, 
whereby the demand for a plebiscite by local Kashmiris 
was seen as an ‘antinational position’, and oppositional 
perspectives were censored or jailed. Paradoxically, 
Kashmiri Muslims had to negotiate their own aspirations 
for modernity and progress after decades of poverty 
and misrule under their princely rulers, the Dogras. In 
the context of state-led socio-economic and educational 
reform, and patronage that sought to empower the local 
population, Kashmiris became dependent on the state, 
“torn between [their] subordination to the state and [their] 
aspirations for national liberation” (Duschinski, et al 2018: 
14-15). By actively taking part in the state apparatus, they 
contributed to the processes of erosion of the demand for 
a plebiscite. Furthermore, they also had to situate their 
political aspirations vis-a-vis the two new nation-states of 
India and Pakistan, both of which laid claims to the entire 
state, and whose borders were heavily militarized. As this 
article will illustrate, this paradoxical context and these 
multiple, sometimes conflicting, aspirations (for example, 
a desire for a political resolution for Kashmir through the 
plebiscite as well as a desire for jobs and employment) 
were to leave an impact on the political subjectivities of 
this post-Partition generation. This article seeks to under-
stand what that impact was, and in doing so, shed light on 
the ways in which conflict, war, or occupation shape the 
subjectivities of those who live under its logic of rule and 
governance. How did Kashmiri Muslims reconcile their 
personal aspirations with the political context prevalent 
in the state? How did they justify their participation in the 
very state that sought to undermine their political rights 
and demands? How did they traverse the political possibil-
ities made available to them? And finally, which of these 
dilemmas or tensions endure today?
This article examines the political subjectivities of the 
first generation of post-Partition Kashmiri Muslims and 
presents their life narratives, both written and oral, as an 
important vantage point from which to understand shifts 
in Kashmiri Muslim society in a time of significant change.6  
It primarily engages with those Kashmiri Muslims who 
were either part of the Kashmiri bureaucratic state or the 
primary beneficiaries of state-led policies of socio-eco-
nomic and educational reform, which included land reform 
and free education.7 Indeed, the early post-Partition 
period in Kashmir saw the creation of an upwardly mobile, 
educated Muslim middle-class that was complicit in the 
everyday work of the state and bureaucracy. In addition, 
it also explores how these narratives are mediated by the 
respondent’s present, a period after the armed resistance 
of the late eighties and nineties, but one in which there 
remains a mass uprising against Indian rule.8 As Kashmiri 
Muslims attempted to navigate the complex political and 
social terrain of Kashmir’s disputed status in the early 
post-Partition period, I argue that their life narratives 
reflect an attempt to seek coherence amidst contradiction 
and incommensurate political and ideological commit-
ments. In particular, the search for coherence in these 
life narratives was reflected in a desire to assert and 
foreground a Kashmiri Muslim identity, one that existed 
alongside other class, regional, and gendered identities, 
but was nonetheless sharpened as a political community.
Recent scholarship on Kashmir has engaged with the 
concept of political subjectivities in important ways, 
drawing attention to the contingent nature of the forma-
tion of political subjectivities as a result of broader social 
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and economic dynamics. Most have primarily focused on 
the pre-Partition period, as well as the period after the 
armed resistance of the late eighties. Chitrelekha Zutshi 
explores how Kashmiri-ness in the eighteenth to twen-
tieth centuries was related to both regional and religious 
forms of belonging, and how both were linked to the 
broader economic and political dynamics of their time 
(Zutshi 2004). Mridu Rai has examined how Islam played an 
important role under the Dogras, arguing that the protest 
by Kashmiri Muslims adopted a religious idiom because the 
Dogra state itself was religiously politicized along Hindu 
lines (Rai 2004). Other scholars have examined particular 
groups, including the political subjectivities of members of 
the Kashmiri left in the period before and after Partition 
(Whitehead 2010) as well as the subjectivities of Kashmir’s 
minority communities, including the Kashmiri Pandits as 
well as various communities living in the different regions 
in the princely Jammu and Kashmir state (Duschinski 2018; 
Bhatia 2018; Sokefeld 2018; Robinson 2013; Snedden 2011; 
Bhan 2013). These studies have examined the interplay 
between the ideologies and practices of the state and the 
making of political subjectivities amongst these diverse 
communities. For example, Mona Bhan has examined, in 
the context of Ladakh, and specifically Kargil, how Indian 
state and military investments in humanitarianism and 
welfare were instruments to enforce modes of consent 
and subjectification (Bhan 2013). In turn, the political 
subjectivities that were produced were highly aligned 
with the imperatives of defense and security (ibid). Cabeiri 
Robinson has examined the shifting subjectivities and 
frames of reference of Kashmiri refugees in Azad Kashmir 
after Partition and after the militancy. The refugee identity 
was transformed as displaced Kashmiris sought to nego-
tiate their multiple relationships with social and political 
sites of power to include the international community 
(Robinson 2013). Building off these studies, this article 
focuses primarily on the immediate post-Partition period, 
and how it helps us understand the making of Kashmiri 
Muslim political subjectivities. By focusing on the educated 
bureaucratic class, it also helps us situate the dynamics 
that went into the processes of state-formation and 
nation-building. Furthermore, it is important to note that 
the desire to seek coherence through religious identity 
continues in the post-Partition period, because the Indian 
state was still perceived as the religious ‘other.’
Methods
This article relies on a mix of oral interviews, autobiogra-
phies, and memoirs. I conducted nearly 25 semi-structured 
interviews in Srinagar, the capital of Indian-held Kashmir, 
between September 2013 and August 2014. This pool is 
a generational sample; many of the individuals who can 
speak directly to the post-Partition period have passed 
away and some were not available to be interviewed 
due to illness or old age. My positionality as a Kashmiri, 
from a Muslim family that had been involved in the state 
bureaucracy at the time, was critical in opening doors, 
especially in speaking with former bureaucrats. Thus, 
after meeting a few individuals that were known to my 
family, I was directed to the others, which resulted in 
snowball sampling. Most of my respondents identified as 
Kashmiri Muslims who had been involved with state insti-
tutions, either as government officials, doctors, teachers, 
students, or engineers. This is important context for this 
article, given my interest in understanding the nature of 
complicity with state institutions at this time. The ages of 
the generation that was in the actual bureaucracy in the 
immediate post-Partition period ranged in their eighties 
and nineties at the time of the interview. Those who were 
students at that time were in their seventies. A majority 
were male, while three were female. This gender disparity 
is reflective of the proportion of men to women in the 
upper and lower echelons of the government bureaucracy 
in the immediate post-Partition period. A number of the 
women who were involved in state bureaucracy have 
already passed away; my interviews were with those  
who either taught or studied in the schools and colleges  
at the time. 
Most of my respondents were born and lived in Srinagar, 
often from the Old City (known colloquially as ‘downtown’) 
and moved to neighborhoods constructed for government 
employees in the fifties and the sixties. This results in an 
‘urban-bias, in this sample. Aside from those who came 
from families that were involved with local shrines, most 
of the families were in business, and in particular, shawls, 
handicrafts, and other small-scale cottage industries. A 
handful came from the few Muslim families that served in 
the government under the Dogras. They were primarily 
educated in government-run schools or in schools run by 
the anjuman (association) Nusrat ul Islam, including the 
prominent Islamia High School, which schooled many 
members of the bureaucratic class. Two males had left 
Kashmir in the first two decades after Partition, and settled 
in Pakistan, returning to Kashmir in recent years either 
to visit family or for political reasons. One female had left 
Kashmir in the seventies and was now settled in the United 
States. One of my respondents was a Kashmiri Pandit, a 
retired English professor from the Women’s College in 
Srinagar who was one of the few Pandits to remain in 
Kashmir during the militancy and is included to provide 
perspective on how inter-religious relations transformed. 
All of my respondents benefited in some way from state 
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policies, either by obtaining admission in educational insti-
tutions or gaining employment in the state’s bureaucracy, 
which helped solidify their family’s financial status and 
upward mobility. A few were educated in Lahore before 
Partition, while some were trained in Aligarh, Amritsar, 
or Lucknow after Partition. Some were sent by the Jammu 
and Kashmir government for additional training to the 
United States or the United Kingdom. Others remained in 
Srinagar for all of their higher education. Most continue 
to live in Srinagar, although they may travel to visit family 
in Delhi and other cities in India, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. 
During the course of the interviews, I asked a number of 
questions regarding their families, childhood, schooling 
days, and work life. Some of my respondents addressed 
these questions directly, while many focused on pivotal 
events in their life, specifically around key moments in 
Kashmiri history, and provided additional details upon my 
prompting. At many times, I had to re-direct the conver-
sation from their interpretation of Kashmiri history—and 
the various betrayals of the Kashmiri leadership—towards 
their own life and experience. The desire to present a 
collective and corrective history (primarily in contrast to 
state or Indian and Pakistani nationalist narratives) was 
one that many of my respondents shared. The interviews 
were conducted in a mix of English, Kashmiri, and Urdu. 
I met with some individuals for six meetings, and others 
for one. With a few, crucial details regarding their role in 
the bureaucracy or any tensions they faced as Kashmiri 
Muslims emerged after multiple meetings, once ‘trust’ was 
developed between me and the respondent. 
The importance of these oral narratives in attempting 
to understand shifts in Kashmir’s post-Partition period 
cannot be understated. It is through these oral narra-
tives that we see a desire to construct a uniquely 
Kashmiri subjectivity, one that seems to get subsumed 
by state-centric narratives of this period that peddle 
Indian or Pakistani nationalist lines. Not only do these 
oral narratives provide an alternative history to state 
narratives, they also depict the desire that individuals 
and communities have to project a sense of ‘wholeness’, 
despite shifts and contradictions, which Katherine Ewing 
has described as a “universal semiotic process by which 
people manage inconsistencies” (Ewing 1990: 253). Ewing 
argues that each self-concept is “experienced as whole 
and continuous, with its own history and memories that 
emerge in a specific context, to be replaced by another 
self-representation when the context changes” (ibid). In 
the context of Kashmir, these narratives show how the 
respondents are constructing ‘new selves’, in response 
to ‘internal and external stimuli’. Their context limits 
the available set of self-representations that emerge, and 
this is also crucial to understanding the range of political 
aspirations that emerge. For example, a number of my 
respondents mentioned how they supported the National 
Conference, a party that later supported the accession to 
India in the pre-Partition period, because of its seemingly 
secular and progressive social and economic policies. In 
the post-Partition period, however, these same individuals 
grew disillusioned with the National Conference, and as 
‘secularism’ became associated with suppressive state 
ideology, sought recourse to movements that appeared to 
be more religiously inflected.
In addition to these oral interviews, this article also 
engages with autobiographies and memoirs. The most 
prominent autobiography is of the first prime minister of 
the state, Sheikh Abdullah, entitled Aatish-i-Chinar, which 
was published in 1982, before the militancy. The rest were 
published after, including accounts written by former 
Chief Ministers Syed Mir Qasim and Farooq Abdullah, 
political leaders of the Plebiscite Conference such as Mirza 
Afzal Beg and Munshi Ghulam Ishaq, religious leaders such 
as Qari Saifuddin of the Jamaat-i-Islam and educationists, 
including Agha Ashraf Ali. While I reference a number of 
these writings, I rely primarily on an autobiography by 
a premier female educationist and the former principal 
of the Women’s College: Shamla Mufti. This is primarily 
because Mufti’s autobiography goes beyond the realm of 
political intrigues in Kashmir and speaks directly to issues 
of social and cultural transformation within families, 
homes, schools, colleges, and workspaces. Her account, 
therefore, gives us a unique perspective that is not found 
in the narratives of the Kashmiri male political and 
religious leadership. Mufti was one of the first Kashmiri 
Muslim women to receive her master’s degree, in Aligarh. 
Her autobiography was originally written in Kashmiri 
and was then translated into Urdu in 1998 under the title 
Chilman se Chaman (translated as From Darkness to Light). 
Writing in the nineties, Shamla provides an overview of 
her family background, education, marriage and home life, 
experiences working in the schools and colleges, as well as 
travels outside of Kashmir. 
Given that how people remember and what they 
remember is historically specific and contextual to the 
time of writing and contexts of telling, “remembering 
has a politics” (Smith and Watson 2010: 22-25). Since all 
of the oral interviews were conducted after 2008, the 
present iteration of the conflict, in which hundreds of 
Kashmiri youth have been killed in the latest phase of 
protests against the Indian state, has permeated these life 
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narratives. The period of the armed resistance in the late 
eighties and nineties permeates in the autobiographies 
and memoirs. This context, which resulted in accelerated 
violence and militarization, has significantly shaped the 
ways in which the early post-Partition period is remem-
bered. Thus, the ‘history’ of this period and the ‘memory’ 
of this period overlap and diverge in particular ways. 
In situating these narratives, I use the framework of 
“collective remembering”, which allows me to understand 
how individual recollection is constantly mediated by 
larger cultural politics (Smith and Watson 2010: 25). The 
collective remembering of pertinent historical events or 
themes dominates the life narratives of my respondents, 
which revolve around particular moments of crisis, 
including Partition and the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah 
as well as particular themes of Muslim empowerment 
and inter-religious relations.9 As we will see, most of my 
respondents spoke of the past not as individuals, but 
in reference to a broader Kashmiri Muslim collective 
history. The Kashmiri Muslim ‘subject’, while marked by 
important fractures, which I note below, was thus consti-
tuted through reference to these historical accounts. 
What is important to note is that this identity emerged 
out of a sense of a shared political context, as the actual 
religious practices of my respondents varied. In addition, 
given that most of these life narratives represented a 
particular constituency of educated Kashmiri Muslims, 
I do not situate them as speaking for or on behalf of all 
Kashmiri Muslims at this time. However, these narratives 
are important as they reflect on broader processes of state 
formation and nation building, complicity, and collabo-
ration, in which the construction of a Kashmiri Muslim 
identity was deeply implicated. What is interesting, then, 
is to understand why or how these narratives seek to speak 
in relation to a broader identity, not that they actually do. 
I identify a number of themes that re-emerged in these 
life narratives, both oral and written. The four predom-
inant themes were: situating themselves in a particular 
Islamic lineage and geography, and highlighting the stark 
condition of Kashmiri Muslims under the Dogras; the 
ideological divergences amongst Kashmiri Muslims and the 
complexity of Partition; the contingent nature of people’s 
decisions and attitudes towards Pakistan in the aftermath 
of accession and Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest; and finally, 
relations with Kashmiri Pandits. Ultimately, these themes 
bring our attention to how post-Partition political and 
social developments consolidated these respondents sense 
of a ‘Kashmiri Muslim identity’. 
Situating the Muslim Middle Class and Dogra Rule
Most of the life narratives began with the narrator’s family 
background, or khandan, in an attempt to situate their 
ancestry in a particular Islamic lineage that traced its 
origins to Central Asia. Particular reference was made to 
whether one’s family was sayyid, peer, or Kashmiri Hindus 
who had converted to Islam. Sayyids were descendants 
of the first Muslim families in Kashmir, who traced their 
lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. A group of sayyid 
missionaries arrived in Kashmir in the fourteenth century 
with Shah-i-Hamdan, a Persian Sufi and religious scholar 
who was seen as influential in spreading Islam to Kashmir 
(Khan 2003: 139-167). Peers were those families who had 
ties to prominent Sufi orders, and were well-versed in 
Persian, including poetry, and the religious sciences. Many 
were caretakers of shrines. Many of the first educated 
Muslims in Kashmir came from these two types of families, 
which were broadly considered as khandani, or of ‘good’ 
and noble family name. To be of khandani background was 
not the same as being wealthy, as some khandani families 
were not well off. Rather, it was a conceptualization of 
social status that depended more on family name and heri-
tage. At times, those families that were highly educated, 
but were not sayyid or peers, were also considered khandani. 
A majority of Kashmiri Muslims were Hindu converts, 
many of them lower caste Hindus that were attracted to 
the egalitarian mission of the Sufi orders (ibid). One of my 
respondents referred to them as “aborigines” of the land.
The desire to narrate a particular Islamic lineage perme-
ated all life narratives, including those Kashmiri Muslims 
who self-identified as secular or not practicing, as well as 
those who were more religiously inclined. For example, 
Syed Mir Qasim, one of the primary left-leaning leaders 
of the National Conference and the former Chief Minister 
of the state (1971-1975), begins his autobiography by 
speaking of his ancestors who arrived in Kashmir from 
Iraq “four hundred years ago” (Qasim 1992: 1-5). Qasim’s 
family is from the Village of Doru in South Kashmir, near 
Verinag. He describes how his father’s uncle, who recorded 
the family’s history in Persian and also wrote on the life of 
the Prophet Muhammad, tells him of his family heritage 
as a sayyid, from the line of Shah Mohammad Syedullah, 
who arrived in Kashmir in 1664 (ibid). In an interview, 
Ghulam Hassan Shah, a retired Indian Administrative 
Services officer, also began by describing his family’s sayyid 
origins on both his maternal and paternal sides, showing 
me a shehjar, or family tree, that was hung on the wall of 
his living room.10 “There was a lot of emphasis…most of 
the families would write ‘Syed’ as a prefix to their name,” 
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he explained, “they were considered noble, they didn’t 
fight with people, couldn’t harm anyone” (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 12 June 2014). Sheikh Abdullah 
also begins his autobiography by describing his family 
as having converted from Hinduism, ‘an aborigine’, but 
situates his birthplace, Soura, as having spiritual impor-
tance for Kashmiri Muslims because it was the home of a 
prominent saint (Abdullah 2013: 22-24). 
Shamla Mufti’s autobiography provides a rich account 
of life under Dogra rule for Kashmiri Muslims. Not only 
does she highlight the importance of khandan, but she also 
marks a shared geopolitical space, reliant upon important 
landmarks and a sense of history. She begins her narrative 
by providing her family background, and in particular, 
situates herself as coming from a peer family. Shamla is 
born as the youngest of four in 1925, the beginning of the 
reign of Majaraja Hari Singh, the last Dogra ruler. Her 
family lives in a neighborhood called Chisty Koach, close 
to the banks of a branch of the Jhelum River in Srinagar. 
On both sides of her family, Shamla traces her peer lineage 
to religious scholars and teachers. While sharing a copy of 
her family tree in the text, she also adds that her father’s 
ancestor, Mullah Mohammad, was a close associate of a 
popular sixteenth century Kashmiri saint, Makhdoom 
Sahib, for whom a shrine is named in Srinagar. Her 
mother’s family is affiliated with the prominent Chisty 
Sufi order. On her maternal side, her ancestor, Sheikh 
Muhammad Ali Chisty, obtained his training from the 
order and would do dhikr in a loud voice, so that his friends 
and loved ones were also made aware of the practices of 
the order. Sheikh Chisty was also responsible for showing 
the hair of the prophet on important religious occasions 
at the Hazratbal Shrine. Shamla’s father is a teacher in an 
Islamic school and her mother, although she was never 
formally schooled, read the Quran, which she taught to  
her children.
Throughout her narrative, when recalling her memories 
of Srinagar city, Shamla shares the names of important 
shrines and religious spaces, and their significance for 
Kashmiri Muslims. For example, she mentions the bazaar 
named after Saeed Ali Akbar Sahib, another Sufi saint 
whose grave is in that area. When speaking of her in-law’s 
home, she provides details of the nearby Jamia Masjid, 
which serves as an important gathering place for followers 
of the Mirwaiz, a title given to the preacher of the  
mosque and spiritual leader for Kashmiri Muslims. Her 
in-laws are involved in the work of ‘fatwagiri’ or giving 
religious opinions. 
Most of the life narratives stress an Islamic genealogy and 
geography, an ‘origin narrative’ that I argue contributes 
to a particular ‘Muslim’ history of Kashmir, one that 
gets elided in official narratives—both scholarly and 
state-propagated—that either focus on the Hindu history 
of Kashmir or its syncretic history, based on the notion 
of Kashmiriyat.11 The desire to assert this history could be 
interpreted in two different ways. One, it is possible that 
this is a reflection of the exclusivist meanings that are 
now being given to Kashmiri identity; in other words, that 
this identity is synonymous with a sense of ‘Muslim-ness’. 
For example, Chitrelekha Zutshi sees this development 
as a direct challenge to Kashmiriyat, a narrative that 
Kashmiri nationalists constructed in the mid-twentieth 
century to “draw Kashmir into the ambit of a secular 
India, while still maintaining its distance from it” (Zutshi 
2018: 7). She argues that Kashmiriyat is under fierce attack 
“in the context of the contemporary conflict, especially 
between India and Kashmir, as Kashmiris seek to distance 
themselves from India and claim a greater identification 
of Kashmir with the Islamic world, defined increasingly 
in West Asian rather than South Asian terms” (ibid). 
Zutshi’s analysis fails to address why Kashmir needs to 
be reclaimed exclusively on South Asian terms given its 
history at the confluence of multiple regions, including 
Central Asia. It also views an affiliation with the Islamic 
world as a problem in and of itself, without explaining 
what that entails and why. Furthermore, it situates 
Kashmiriyat as a natural, objective narrative for the 
history of Kashmir, without acknowledging the way that 
Kashmiriyat was in and of itself a political construction in 
its time.
While an interpretation of an exclusivist Islamic identity 
is possible, it is not reflected by the some respondents’ 
discussion of their relationships with Pandits, which I go 
into below. Rather, I suggest that the desire on the part 
of these life narratives to focus on a ‘Muslim’ history of 
Kashmir is to challenge the state-sponsored dominant 
narratives of a shared, syncretic history that either erased 
or undermined Kashmir’s ‘Muslim’ identity in attempts to 
seek connection with India. The focus of these life narra-
tives on that ‘Muslim’ identity is to contest and reclaim 
that history. In addition, an attempt to include histories 
of learning, writing, language (Persian), and cultural 
interchange, especially between Central Asia, the Arab 
world, and Kashmir, is also revealing. Instead of seeing this 
solely in an Islamic exclusivist paradigm, I suggest that 
this discussion of origins can be seen as a desire to expand 
the geographical contours of Kashmir from the limitations 
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of modern statehood, and the hardening of boundaries, 
which have situated Kashmir staunchly in the realm of 
‘South Asia’ (which Zutshi seems to have no issues with). 
For my respondents, Kashmir was a civilizational hub, of 
language, literature, and religious exchange; a discussion 
of these older modes of interchange and influence also 
underscores then how those connections were dismantled 
and disrupted with the arrival of the Dogra regime, and 
most recently, the Indian state.
While most of the life narratives began with the Dogra 
period, a few went as far back as the Mughal period in 
Kashmir, describing it as starting Kashmir’s ‘foreign 
rule’. Their narrative followed a historical account of the 
Mughals, and then recalled the ‘repressive Afghan and 
Sikh rules’. The discussion of Dogra rule began with the 
‘sale’ of Kashmir to the Dogra ruler through the Treaty of 
Amritsar in 1846. It continued with a few key moments, 
including the ‘Shawlbaf Protest’, during which 28 shawl 
weavers were killed at the hands of the Dogra army for 
protesting against unjust taxation in 1865; the submis-
sion of a memorandum in 1924 by a number of Kashmiri 
Muslim elites to British Viceroy Lord Reading, highlighting 
the stark conditions of the Muslims; and finally, the 
events around 1931, what is known as the beginning of 
the Kashmiri freedom struggle against Dogra rule. In one 
such example, Shamla describes how the children would 
be able to see Haji Rather’s bridge from their home, and 
hear of the ‘Shawlbaf Protest’ from their elders, marking 
an important incident in the history of Dogra oppression 
against Kashmiri Muslims. According to her elders, a 
Kashmiri Pandit ran the shawl factory, taking a tax of five 
rupees of the eight a shawl weaver would earn. When the 
weavers attempted to meet with the government to speak 
of this injustice, the officials denied them the meeting. 
They started a procession, and the Dogra army attempted 
to stop it. On the bridge, the army fired, and a number of 
them were thrown into the Jhelum River and drowned. 
Shamla describes this incident as the first in a long line of 
revolts against injustice, which became the shape of a full-
fledged movement in 1931 (Mufti 1994: 24). Here, popular 
history is narrated to provide a sense of a shared experi-
ence of repression under the Dogras, and, reflecting on the 
contemporary moment, a longer history of revolts against 
injustice that goes into Kashmir’s pre-Partition period.
Whether a Kashmiri Muslim’s family background was khan-
dani or not, a vast majority of the life narratives referred 
to the repressive rule of the Dogras for all Muslims. They 
spoke of the Muslim peasants’ economic exploitation 
under the feudal system and a lack of education. The 
educated class complained of discrimination when seeking 
employment (Abdullah 2013). Many mentioned that their 
family members went outside Kashmir to places like 
Lahore in Punjab for better educational and economic 
prospects. And while Kashmiri Pandits also complained 
of being discriminated against under the Dogras—as 
evidenced by the state-subject movement of the 1920’s—in 
these life narratives, Dogra rule was not simply oppressive 
towards Kashmiris, but in particular, towards Kashmiri 
Muslims. I suggest that this is because in the 1930s and 
1940s, when most of the respondents were still coming 
of age, Pandits were much more represented in the 
state’s administration as well as in schools and colleges. 
In contrast, the mostly Muslim peasantry was suffering 
under heavy taxation. As a result, Dogra oppression was 
seen as exclusively being meted out to Kashmiri Muslims, 
which allowed for a sense of a shared history of struggle. 
As Mridu Rai has stated, it was because of the “lack of 
recourse available to Kashmiri Muslims from a Hindu king 
that at the moment of their most dire need they turned 
to the divine or spiritual realms rather than to the state” 
(Rai 2004: 9). She argues that the invocation of religion, 
especially in terms of the forms of resistance against Dogra 
rule, by Kashmiri Muslims in the period between 1846 and 
1947 suggests a “positive cultural and religious affilia-
tion, quite as much as attempts flowing from material 
concerns to rectify a sense of religiously based discrimi-
nation perpetrated by a Hindu state” (ibid). Given that the 
Dogras politicized religious identities in their processes 
of state-making, as Rai has shown in her work, there is, 
therefore, a longer history of asserting religious identities 
for counter-hegemonic aims. What is an interesting shift in 
the context of the post-Partition period, however, is that 
the state is ostensibly secular, and does not rely on religion 
to construct its legitimacy, as it did under the Dogras. I 
suggest that the desire to assert a Muslim identity in the 
post-Partition period had less to do with the secular nature 
of the Kashmiri state government, and more to do with its 
practices of state-formation, which enabled a number of 
contradictory subjectivities that had to be reconciled.
The struggle against Dogra rule was a common theme 
in all of the narratives; some of the individuals who had 
reached early adulthood during that period also wrote or 
spoke of their own involvement in the struggle against 
the Maharaja, while others recalled what they perceived 
as ‘Muslim backwardness’ in that period. Syed Mir Qasim 
declared that he was “born at a time when the mountains 
of Kashmir echoed with the sighs and wails of the helpless 
subjects of the Maraharaja Hari Singh’s repressive rule… 
every shanty had a tale of hunger and tyranny” (Qasim 
1992: v). By situating himself in the Kashmiri freedom 
struggle, Qasim attempted to provide legitimacy to his 
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narrative. He continued that he was only 14 years old when 
he “raised the banner of revolt against a rich landlord who 
had exited his poor tenant from his house. [He] collected a 
big crowd and made his first public speech… [the] incident 
gave [him] confidence in [his] own oratory and catapulted 
[him] into politics with a missionary zeal” (ibid). 
By both situating themselves within a broader Islamic 
lineage and spiritual geography in Kashmir, and also 
foregrounding the condition of Kashmiri Muslims in the 
pre-1947 period, the life narratives I collected shared some 
striking similarities in how they began, and how they 
provided context for an individual’s life. They situated 
themselves firmly within a larger moral and cultural 
universe of Islam, and recalled their experiences by 
speaking to a shared sense of a Kashmiri Muslim commu-
nity, one that had its own ‘history’, with key dates, places 
and events that had shaped its trajectory in the late nine-
teenth and twentieth century. They also explicitly rejected 
a shared Kashmiri Muslim and Pandit backwardness under 
the Dogras. 
In the life narratives of the Kashmiri Muslims, the desire 
to assert a ‘Muslim’ identity and history was, perhaps, 
in response to the communalized political discourse 
throughout India. However, these individuals wanted 
to highlight their sense of ‘difference’, in opposition or 
outright rejection of the exigencies of an Indian national 
identity, not their ‘loyalty to the nation’. This shared 
sense of a particular history today, however, did not entail 
that the community was marked by a sense of coherence. 
Indeed, we will see how people recalled a number of ideo-
logical divergences that marked Kashmir’s transition from 
Dogra rule.
From Jinnah to Nehru: Ideological Divergence and the 
Complexity of Partition
Scholarship surrounding Partition in Kashmir revolves 
around Sheikh Abdullah and his ostensibly secular nation-
alist political party, the National Conference, and their 
alliance with Jawaharlal Nehru and the Indian National 
Congress.12 While some scholars mention the role of the 
Muslim Conference, which was a pro-Pakistan party and 
more in line with the Muslim League, Mirwaiz Yusuf 
Shah and his followers were seen as a minority voice 
in the Valley whose Muslims evidently denounced the 
two-nation theory, and were behind Sheikh Abdullah. The 
disappearance of those who espoused alternative politics 
from the archives, and thus, from most scholarly work, is a 
defining trait of most scholarship, but is beyond the scope 
of this article. However, the story that emerges from the 
life narratives speaks to a much more complicated series of 
loyalties and allegiances, a story that exists, as it were, in 
popular memory. 
The National Conference emerged from the Muslim 
Conference in the late 1930’s, in an attempt by Sheikh 
Abdullah to secularize the future direction of the freedom 
struggle against Dogra rule. Thus, many members of the 
National Conference were initially the founders of the 
Muslim Conference, and still held many of the same ideas 
as before, but went along with the Sheikh for strategic 
purposes. After the creation of the National Conference, 
the Muslim Conference was not active for some years, but 
became active once again in the early 1940s, especially 
in Jammu, under the leadership of Chowdhary Ghulam 
Abbas, a Muslim leader from Jammu. The life narra-
tives did not provide a definitive demographic of each 
groups’ supporters, but they do suggest that the Muslim 
Conference also had a presence in the Valley. It appeared 
that the Muslim Conference enjoyed a stronghold in the 
Old City of Srinagar from a more traditional elite class 
of Muslims or from rural Muslim landlords who were 
opposed to the National Conferences’ emphasis on land 
reform.13 Many of these were khandani families, often with 
Sufi backgrounds. The National Conference, on the other 
hand, enjoyed ascendency with the more left-leaning, 
newly educated classes, those who were not necessarily 
from khandani backgrounds. In Chilman se Chaman, 
Shamla described this as the sher (lion)—bakra (sheep) 
split (lions were supporters of Sheikh Abdullah and the 
National Conference, while the sheep were supporters 
of Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah and the Muslim Conference). She 
described her in-laws, with whom she lived for much of 
her early married life, as being supporters of the Muslim 
Conference, and narrated how the men and women would 
go to the Jamia Masjid every Friday to hear Mirwaiz’s 
sermon (Mufti 1994: 97). She recalled one particular inci-
dent when Muhammad Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League 
visited Kashmir in 1944. In front of nearly 100,000 people, 
he spoke at the Jamia Masjid, propagating the two-nation 
theory. Shamla remembered how she and the women of 
the house also attended the speech, and saw Fatima Jinnah, 
his sister, sitting in their midst.14
Qari Saifuddin, one of the founders of the Jamaat-i-
Islam in Kashmir, considered himself a supporter of the 
National Conference until he attended Jinnah’s speech. 
In his autobiography, he stated that Jinnah’s historic 
address “changed the way of thinking of the educated 
class, with the two-nation theory being acceptable, but 
a large majority here were still holding the flag of the 
48 |  HIMALAYA Fall 2018
National Conference” (Saifuddin 1980: 22). The reasons, 
he continued, were twofold: one, the National Conference 
“tarnished the reputation of the educated Muslims place 
to place by calling them ‘government agents’ or ‘beggars of 
government jobs’—unfortunately, educated Muslims were 
very rare and few in number” (ibid). 
As Kashmiri Muslims increasingly studied outside Kashmir 
in the 1930s and 1940s, they came across a wide spectrum 
of political ideologies that were at play in British India. For 
those Kashmiri Muslims who founded and became active 
in the National Conference, the struggle against Dogra 
rule and left-leaning political trends in the subcontinent 
played an important role in shaping their politics. Dr. Mir 
Nazir Ahmed, who studied medicine in Lucknow in the 
1950s, shared the story of his father, Mir Ghulam Rasool, 
who was one of two Muslims selected by the Maharaja 
to go to Harvard for engineering in the 1930s. He spoke 
to me of the other Kashmiri Muslims, mostly men, who 
went to Aligarh and Lahore for their studies: “The air was 
thick with Quit India,” he stated, “they got caught up in 
it”. When describing his father and his fathers’ colleagues’ 
initial support for the National Conference, he explained:
They developed a dichotomy in their thoughts…
they would recite Alamma Iqbal and go into a 
trance with his poetry, at the same time, they were 
influenced by Mahatma Gandhi and Satyagraha. 
These were antagonistic views. Only few had a 
clear-cut idea of what they would want. My father 
was caught up in this middle…this is what hap-
pened to most Kashmiris who were educated (Inter-
view with participant, Srinagar, 15 December 2013).
For Dr. Nazir, an attraction to Iqbal and Gandhi is seen 
today as an ‘antagonistic view’, given the diverging 
trajectories of both of their ideologies over time. Whether 
it was seen as antagonistic for people at the time is less 
clear. Even Sheikh Abdullah, who aligned his politics with 
the Indian National Congress affirmed his appreciation 
for Iqbal, who is usually credited with providing the 
ideological backdrop to the idea of Pakistan. The Sheikh 
even named a building in the University of Kashmir after 
him. For the Sheikh, being committed to Islam did not 
mean that one could not be a secular nationalist. In fact, 
he declared that his nationalist convictions came from the 
Quran. This perspective, of course, is not so different from 
those Muslim leaders in India who aligned themselves with 
the Indian National Congress, such as Maulana Abul Kalam 
Azad and Maulana Husssain Ahmed Madani. As some 
respondents clarified, a number of Kashmiri Muslims were 
attracted to the progressive aims of the Indian National 
Congress, as well as its purported secularism, as they knew 
they needed the help and support of Kashmiri Pandits 
in their fight against the Dogras. Crucially, they also 
believed, or were led to believe, that they would be able 
to enjoy autonomy in an independent India. In their eyes, 
the feudal interests that were backing the Muslim League 
would not allow Kashmiris to enact land reforms and 
other progressive policies in the state.15 Aside from these 
ideological concerns, I also gathered from these narratives 
that the National Conference was seen as the more modern 
party; at a time when Kashmir’s Muslims were desperate 
to catch up with the rest of the world, the National 
Conference was ideally situated to bring Muslims out of 
their purported backwardness. As Qari Saifuddin noted 
in his autobiography, “in those days it was very rare to 
see the educated youngsters who had a beard, a majority, 
rather a big majority of educated people were ashamed to 
have a beard. They thought it was a sign of backwardness 
and ignorance. They felt proud to shave it off (Saifuddin 
1980: 31). The beard, in this case, symbolized ‘tradition’, a 
physical marker that must be removed in order to culti-
vate a particular modern sensibility. 
Most of the life narratives acknowledged Sheikh Abdullah’s 
popularity at the time of Partition, especially given the 
National Conferences’ anti-monarchical campaign. Yet, 
some of my respondents clarified that support for Sheikh 
Abdullah did not necessarily entail support for the Indian 
National Congress, or India. Indeed, a few shared with me 
how a number of National Conference leaders were firmly 
against the accession. One was Anwar Ashai, a retired engi-
neer and former student activist. He was part of one of the 
first classes to study engineering at the National Institute 
of Technology. Anwar was also the son of Ghulam Ahmed 
Ashai, an educator, who was seen as being a close associate 
of the Sheikh and was instrumental in the creation of the 
University of Kashmir, of which he served as the registrar 
during the Sheikh’s government (1947-1953). Anwar’s 
father was one of the few Muslims who served in the 
Maharaja’s administration, but was also involved in the 
Muslim Conference, and later, in the National Conference. 
Although his government employment did not allow him 
to fully take part in the National Conference, as a senior 
Muslim official, he would give its members advice and help 
them with their statements. However, Anwar recalled that 
his father was not attracted to the socialist leanings of the 
National Conference, but rather its emphasis on empow-
ering Kashmiri Muslims, especially through education. 
Ghulam Ahmed Ashai came from a prominent khandani 
family, which had ties to the Naqshband Sufi order. He 
stood first in his Master’s in Persian at Aligarh. Anwar told 
me how his father had travelled to various cities in India 
before Partition. According to Anwar, his father “became 
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aware of the insecurity of Muslims in India, he had seen 
it firsthand, he knew it would not be good for Kashmir” 
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 21 February, 2014). 
He was skeptical of the sincerity of the Indian nationalist 
leadership towards Kashmir, and attempted to persuade 
Sheikh Abdullah against aligning the National Conference 
with them, but as Anwar recalled, the Sheikh was too 
“lured by power” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 
21 February, 2014). Ghulam Ahmad Ashai was also not 
drawn to Pakistan for reasons that seem less clear; Anwar 
believed that his father would have preferred an  
independent Kashmir.
The confusion that Kashmiri Muslims faced around the 
time of Partition, and their varying attraction to and skep-
ticism of the two main parties, was a recurring theme in 
most of the life narratives. It was in the process of making 
sense of the varying ideologies at the time, that a Kashmiri 
Muslim political subject was being shaped, one that was 
responding to multiple aspirations. What we can make 
from this ‘confusion’ however is that support for either 
party was based on a series of local concerns, whether it be 
the consolidation of class interests, the desire for political 
and economic empowerment, or the desire to end monar-
chical rule. It was not only linked to the divisions between 
the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress in the 
subcontinent, although it was, at various points, informed 
by it. Nonetheless, when the time for Partition came, it 
was the impending tribal raid from Pakistan that drew a 
number of Kashmiri Muslims into the fold of the National 
Conference and its defense against the raid. They felt that 
they had no choice; they had heard reports of the brutality 
and were prepared to defend Kashmir against aggression. 
This did not mean, however, that they sided with India, as 
we will see. Those Muslims who were staunchly pro-Paki-
stan, or aligned with the Muslim Conference voluntarily 
went across the border to Pakistan, or were forcibly sent 
there by the Sheikh’s government.16
However, as we will see below, my respondents stated 
that in the post-Partition period, the brutality of Sheikh 
Abdullah’s government towards its dissenters, in addition 
to India’s increasing interference in Kashmir’s affairs 
(outside of the involvement in defense, foreign policy, and 
communications as marked by the Treaty of Accession) 
and Hindu nationalist politics in Jammu and elsewhere, led 
many Kashmiri Muslims, even those that were previously 
open to the limited accession, to desire an alternative 
political arrangement.17 Yet, as I detail, fear and the 
contingent nature of this period made it difficult for many 
of them to act. 
Pakistan, the Aftermath of Accession, and Contingencies 
After the Sheikh’s Arrest
When trying to get a sense of the ideological shifts that 
occurred after partition, I was struck by the ways in which 
some of my respondents spoke of their perspectives 
after partition, which to me, appeared to be in conflict 
with their public personas as members of the seemingly 
pro-Indian bureaucratic class. Although a number of the 
life narratives referred to the ‘confusion’ faced by Kashmiri 
Muslims before the accession and the multiple influ-
ences that were at play in shaping their ideology, a vast 
majority of them described how a majority of Kashmiri 
Muslims, including those who considered themselves to 
be more secular, were pro-Pakistan in the aftermath of 
the accession, and especially after the Sheikh’s arrest in 
1953.18 What did it mean to be pro-Pakistan in this time, 
especially when Pakistan was the only other political 
option made available under the conditions of the United 
Nations mandated plebiscite? To be sure, recollecting 
this ‘memory’ could be influenced by the contemporary 
moment, which is marked by increased anti-India senti-
ments in the Valley. My respondents might not have felt 
comfortable divulging if they were, indeed, in support of 
India in the past. Incidentally, however, this perspective 
was shared by Karan Singh, the son of Maharaja Hari Singh 
and Governor of Kashmir, with Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru in the 1950s. In a collection of his letters 
to Nehru, Karan Singh repeatedly expressed his misgivings 
surrounding the loyalties of Kashmiri Muslim bureaucrats, 
calling upon Nehru to increase central representation 
in Kashmir’s bureaucracy (Alam 2006: 124-125, 141). 
Nonetheless, many Kashmiri Muslims went on to take 
various postings in the Bakshi administration after Sheikh 
Abdullah’s arrest. This may seem bewildering at first, given 
Bakshi’s strong pro-Indian stance, but must be understood 
in the context of post-Partition developments in Kashmir. 
At the time of the tribal raid, Sheikh Abdullah wrote in 
his autobiography that the perspective of Pakistan had 
been tarnished amongst Kashmiri Muslims (Abdullah 
2013: 363). Yet, nearly all of my respondents mentioned 
that most of the Muslims in Kashmir, aside from some 
members of the senior National Conference leadership, 
were pro-Pakistan. Being pro-Pakistan in this time ranged 
widely: some believed that Muslims would be safe in 
Pakistan and could ‘progress’, while others were dismayed 
by Hindu right wing politics in India, which had reached 
their borders in the form of the Praja Parishad in Jammu. 
Some expressed nostalgia for the social and economic 
connections between Kashmir and cities in the Pakistan 
part of Punjab, while others, including those involved in 
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the Jamaat-i-Islam, expressed the desire for a moral state 
that would be rooted in Islam. The most common factor, 
however, was that they became disillusioned by increasing 
Indian interference in Kashmir, including the Indian hand 
in Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, which suggests the level to 
which this stance was intended as a potent rejection of 
India. As many respondents mentioned, the events of 
August 1953 solidified anti-Indian sentiment amongst 
many Kashmiri Muslims. Even Syed Mir Qasim, former 
Chief Minister, in his autobiography, declared “the faith of 
people in Kashmir in democracy and in rule of constitution 
had shaken…when Sheikh was disposed” (Qasim 1992: vii). 
Agha Ashraf, a prominent educator, added that with the 
arrest of the Sheikh, “the whole [of] Kashmir had erupted, 
there were demonstrations from morning until evening 
in every part of Kashmir, and people in herds joined these 
processions. This was a type of referendum” (Ali 2010). It is 
interesting that Agha Ashraf is not clear what this ‘refer-
endum’ was for. It could have been in favor of Pakistan 
given the options for a plebiscite at the time would have 
only included India and Pakistan, but it is also possible 
that it was simply a referendum against India, suggesting 
that people’s political desires might not have fit squarely 
into pro-India or pro-Pakistan stances. As Agha Ashraf 
wrote in the contemporary period where notions of an 
‘independent Kashmir’ are more popular, one wonders if 
the unclear reference to a referendum would have entailed 
an expression of a pro-Kashmir sentiment, one that was 
tied, in this time, to the identity of Sheikh Abdullah. 
Nonetheless, being pro-Pakistan, albeit for varying 
reasons, was an example of how the Kashmiri Muslim 
identity evolved in the post-Partition period.  
Khalil Fazili, who was one of the Kashmiris that went to 
Pakistan in October 1948, met me in Srinagar, where he 
was visiting his family and friends. Khalil was working 
with the Dogras before Partition, but had a number of 
issues with his employer. In his words: 
At the time, most people were with Pakistan, they 
felt that Muslims would be safe there. There was no 
thinking of an Islamic state… People who went to 
Pakistan were starting to feel insecure about their 
positions in Kashmir. They saw that the Pandits had 
all the jobs, Muslims were discriminated against. 
So they moved. They had the idea that they would 
do well professionally, for their families, their 
futures… and there were so many historical connec-
tions between Lahore and Kashmir. People had 
businesses there, it made more sense for people to 
go there (Interview with participant, Srinagar,  
1 June 2014). 
Khalil mentioned that his reason for going to Pakistan was 
also because of discrimination in Kashmir; it was not for 
any religious reason as he was more “secular minded”. 
Khalil’s desire to assert himself as a secular Muslim, here, 
is important, as is his mention of an ‘Islamic state’. He 
provided a list of reasons for why Kashmiris were attracted 
to Pakistan; none of them were drawn from any sort of 
‘religious ideology’. He repeated this point a number of 
times, perhaps to contest Indian and Pakistani nation-
alist tropes that foreground religious ideology as being a 
determinant of people’s choices at the time. Furthermore, 
in today’s global context that has increasingly been 
defined by the War on Terror, many Kashmiri Muslims 
did not feel comfortable foregrounding any desire for an 
‘Islamic state’ at that time. For them, Pakistan represented 
a state where ‘Muslims would be safe’, rather than one 
defined by a particular religious ideology. This question 
has undoubtedly been debated in the historiography of the 
Pakistan state.19 Whatever the shift in the ideology of the 
Pakistan state may be today, Khalil reiterates that his idea 
of Pakistan then, did not entail what Pakistan is now (a 
state that is increasingly defined by its religious ideology): 
“no one had imagined Partition and what would happen. 
They had no idea about Muslim state or Islamic state… they 
didn’t know what that would bring them” (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 1 June 2014). 
Ghulam Hassan Shah also mentioned to me that:
Kashmiri Muslims in the bureaucracy wanted to go 
to Pakistan…. They thought that it was better for 
Kashmir to go to Pakistan because it was a Muslim 
country, we would be safe there, and because Indi-
an Hindus had started showing their teeth one way 
or another (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 12 
June 2014). 
While Shah did not clarify what he meant by “showing 
their teeth,” I took it to mean that despite ‘Indian 
Hindu’ deference to secularism, many Kashmiri Muslims 
perceived that they were, in fact, communal. This percep-
tion animated a number of my conversations, as many 
made reference to the contemporary state of communal 
tensions in India exacerbated by the rise of the Bharatiya 
Janata Party and right-wing politics. The discussion of 
contemporary politics in Pakistan was much more unset-
tled. A number of my respondents became defensive, 
arguing that had Kashmir gone to Pakistan at the time, the 
country would not be in ‘the state it is today’. They argued 
that Pakistan, ‘despite its problems’, was the only country 
that raised the issue of Kashmir internationally. Others 
suggested their indignation at the contemporary political 
malaise in both India and Pakistan, arguing that neither 
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country had the best interests of Kashmiris in mind 
and had exploited the issue to serve their own national 
interests. While most respondents were able to differen-
tiate between their impressions of Pakistan then, versus 
Pakistan today, their perspectives on India after Sheikh 
Abdullah’s arrest appeared to be consistent overtime.  
Khalil mentioned the historical connections between 
Lahore and Kashmir, as one of the reasons why Kashmiris 
were more attracted to Pakistan, which was reiterated 
by a number of respondents (Interview with participant, 
Srinagar, 1 June 2014). One of the biggest changes they 
encountered after Partition was that they were no longer 
able to travel to places like Lahore and Rawalpindi, 
where a number of them had gone for higher education 
or business. This was one of the primary closures of the 
post-Partition period. The loss of ties to the regions that 
became Pakistan was described in both emotional and 
material terms. Many families had individuals who left 
for Pakistan, or were exiled there, and were unable to see 
their family members for long stretches of time. In his 
autobiography, Agha Ashraf recalled his trip to Lahore 
with his grandfather, and how ‘modern’ it seemed to him 
after coming from Srinagar. It was in Lahore, he stated, 
that he “used a fork and knife for the first time” (Ali 2010: 
12). Thus, Pakistan was seen as a space where this aspi-
ration for modernity, that all of my respondents shared, 
could be met. Some mentioned how Kashmiris would use 
rock salt from Pakistan, which stopped coming to Kashmir, 
leading to a shortage of salt in the first few years after 
Partition. Rock salt and a green handkerchief became an 
important political symbol for Pakistan; indeed, leaders 
of the Plebiscite Front, a political opposition organization 
that led the demand for a plebiscite, would raise both the 
salt and the handkerchief in rallies and tell those who were 
gathered, ‘This is our foundation’. Furthermore, Zahid 
G. Mohammad, a writer, stated that Kashmir’s historic 
economic ties to Central Asia went through Pakistan. 
Timber and fruit would be transported along the Jhelum 
and into other parts of Central Asia. Kashmiri businessmen 
suffered great losses when this route was blocked after 
1947. Nighat Shafi, who runs a non-government organiza-
tion, and was one of the granddaughters of Ghulam Ahmad 
Ashai, mentioned that her grandmother would keep asking 
the other family members when the road to Pakistan 
would open again. 
Dr. Naseer Shah, the former principal of the Government 
Medical College in Srinagar, was studying in Lahore at the 
King Edward Medical College at the time of Partition, and 
was repatriated to Srinagar. Because of the heightened 
sense of insecurity at the time, he explained his fear that 
Pakistani officials might see him as a spy. His sister, Miss 
Mahmooda Ali Shah, who was one of the first Kashmiri 
Muslim women to get educated in Lahore and was involved 
with the National Conference, told Nehru to speak to 
Liaqat Ali Khan and asked that her brother be sent back 
to Srinagar safely. Dr. Naseer is known amongst this class 
of individuals for being one of the few Kashmiri Muslim 
men to marry a Kashmiri Pandit woman. Dr. Naseer’s wife, 
Dr. Girja Dhar, was also a prominent doctor in the Valley. 
They met, and married in London, where they had lived for 
some years for work. Dr. Naseer explained that his family 
was ‘secular’ and ‘open-minded’ and did not subscribe to 
the Muslim Conference, but they still wanted to be with 
Pakistan. He explained:
We were all fascinated to be a part of Pakistan. 
No one was sure what would happen, but most of 
us were educated in Lahore. Rawalpindi was next 
door. It cost 10 rupees to go there on government 
transport. The bus would leave Srinagar at 9am and 
arrive in Rawalpindi at 3pm. The drivers knew my 
family… sometimes we even got a free ride. None 
of us ever thought of Delhi… it was so far. From 
Delhi, the newspaper would come after four days. 
But the papers from Lahore would be here the next 
morning (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 25 
June 2014).
This imaginary of Pakistan, unlike the recent de-terri-
torialized turn in Pakistan scholarship, is territorially 
grounded. Pakistan was a space that many people had 
economic, filial, and educational ties with a place that was 
much more ‘proximate’ than India. 
If so many Kashmiri Muslims from this class were opposed 
to the accession and wanted to join Pakistan at the time, 
why did they continue to take part in the bureaucracy, 
especially after Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest? I posed this ques-
tion to my respondents. In their responses, most referred 
to the precarious nature of their decision at this time.20 A 
majority of my respondents told me that people did not 
think that the halaat (situation) would go on indefinitely.21 
Even after the Sheikh was arrested, they assumed that 
since the matter was raised in the United Nations Security 
Council, India and Pakistan would resolve the issue and 
a plebiscite would soon take place. In the meantime, my 
respondents felt that they must get educated, build the 
infrastructure in the region, and remain employed in the 
bureaucracy. The realization that things could soon change 
was also exemplified by their desire to remain in the 
Valley, and not be transferred to other places in the state, 
including Jammu. Nighat Shafi told me “a lot of Kashmiri 
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Muslims didn’t agree to be posted in Jammu…because they 
thought that things would change and Kashmir might go 
to Pakistan” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 5 May 
2014). Besides this, many were afraid of being in a Hindu-
majority place, as they had “heard that none of the Hindus 
rent their houses to Muslims,” a sentiment that lends 
itself once more to the notion of Pakistan being ‘safe’ for 
Muslims (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 27 February 
2014). In another example, Mohammad Amin Chisti, 
who served as a registrar in the University of Kashmir, 
revealed that he “didn’t agree to go to Jammu because of 
the threat… Many Muslims were scared by the killings of 
thousands of innocent Muslims there” (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 27 February 2014).22
The Kashmiri state also conducted propaganda about 
political and social developments in Pakistan, which may 
have also impacted my respondents’ decision to remain in 
the bureaucracy. The Department of Information gathered 
material that highlighted how the Pakistani state was 
beholden to imperial—namely American—interests and 
was also interfering in the politics of Azad Kashmir. This 
perception was oftentimes affirmed by letters that were 
sent between Kashmiris residing in Pakistan and their 
families in the Valley. I came across one letter sent by 
Ghulam Ahmad Ashai to his son Ghulam Qadir, who had 
been exiled to Pakistan by Sheikh Abdullah. The letter 
is dated 8 August 1952, and was sent from Raj Bagh, in 
Srinagar, to Bohar Bazaar, in Rawalpindi. While the letter 
was written before Sheikh Abdullah’s arrest, it is still 
important as it points to perceptions about conditions in 
Pakistan that may have persuaded a number of educated 
Kashmiris to reconsider their fate with India. In the letter, 
Ghulam Ahmad Ashai wrote of his meeting with his rela-
tives, G.K. Drabu:
I have not met G.K. Drabu yet, but to those who he 
had met, he has given me a really grim and woeful 
picture of the state of affairs on that side and of the 
moral and social degradation which is rampant in 
your country. His account of your and Yasin’s life 
also is not such as could give any satisfaction to any 
parent. I wish to God that you may be still be saved 
from the vicious and undesirable habits that seem 
to be so common there. G.K. Drabu’s own habits so 
exhibited here make me tremble for both of you. 
It seems that your country is taking the lead in 
practicing everything and the utmost that is both 
un-Islamic and immoral. However, so long as your 
present mood lasts, I feel myself utterly helpless 
and can only pray to God that he may keep you safe 
even in that filthy atmosphere. If the treatment of 
the rulers to our people there is insulting as stated 
by Yasin and confirmed by Drabu, why in the name 
of heaven do people like you suffer this insult 
and stay on? The only honorable course in such 
circumstance would be to give up everything, come 
home and carry on a relentless struggle against the 
designs of those people by exposing them naked 
to those who still may have any misunderstanding 
about them. After all, if it is to be subservience, bet-
ter have it until there is some respect attached to it. 
The greatest justification for the stand taken up by 
the party in power here is the treatment that our 
people are… [undecipherable]… over there, even 
in conditions when they had need in fact keen and 
urgent need of the utmost goodwill of our people. 
I wonder how they would behave if they obtained 
power here (Ministry of States, 1952).
While Ghulam Ahmad Ashai did not state explicitly what 
concerned him, it appears that far from being a ‘safe place 
for Muslims’, these reports from family members who 
had travelled to or lived in Pakistan spoke of ‘moral and 
social degradation’ in that ‘filthy atmosphere’. Aside from 
these moral concerns, Ashai also made reference to the 
“treatment of the rulers to our people there” (Ministry of 
States, 1952). It is possible Ashai was referring to the shift 
in the Pakistani leadership’s approach to the province in 
1952. As Christopher Snedden carefully details, Pakistan-
administered Kashmir, which initially enjoyed some 
autonomy as a province, came into the fold of Pakistan’s 
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs, which allowed the Pakistani 
state’s interests in the region to remain paramount 
(Snedden 2012). For this reason, perhaps, Ashai urged his 
son to come back to Kashmir, and let those who still had 
faith in the Pakistani state know of the developments on 
the other side of the border. It might not be far-fetched 
to assume that these discussions permeated throughout 
the educated and bureaucratic classes, given that many 
of them had family members who were in Pakistan, 
and led a number of individuals to forego their initial 
support for Pakistan. This is an important consideration 
given that most of my respondents still defined Kashmiri 
aspirations in the post-Partition period as being aligned 
with Pakistan. How do we understand the contradictions 
between their recollections of their views of Pakistan then 
and Ashai’s letter? I suggest that the range of political 
possibilities made available to Kashmiri Muslims in this 
time were restrictive; neither Pakistan nor India was able 
to fully accommodate Kashmiri aspirations at the time. 
While one option appeared to be more attractive than the 
other, there was a complex range of social and political 
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subjectivities that were continuously being shaped and 
reshaped by the restrictive conditions under Indian rule 
and political conflict.
The contingencies of the period were also marked by 
financial insecurity. A number of bureaucrats spoke of 
their financial concerns at the time. In one case, Abdul 
Sattar Mir, who was a secretary in the bureaucracy, 
acknowledged the poverty and financial strain that 
informed his, and many others’ decision to get a govern-
ment job. Financial insecurity and the reign of fear that 
pervaded the state, both under the Sheikh and Bakshi, 
were the two primary reasons that many bureaucrats 
stated they remained ‘silent’ on the political developments 
in Kashmir. 
Even those belonging to parties that were ostensibly 
against the state, such as the Jamaat-i-Islam, were also 
beholden to its patronage and had to ‘compromise’ due to 
financial need. Qari Saifuddin wrote in his autobiography 
how his friend, Syed Qaiser Qalander, worked as a program 
assistant at Radio Kashmir. Qalander asked Saifuddin 
to broadcast a radio program on Islam. The chief of the 
Jamaat-i-Islam party at the time, Saad Uddin, informed 
Saifuddin that he should not go on the state-run radio as 
“it would be a meaningless effort of patching the truth 
with falsehood and it will give no benefit to religion” 
(Saifuddin 1980: 36). Nevertheless, Saifuddin mentioned 
how his father became ill and he had to pay for his sister’s 
wedding, leaving him with little financial means. Under 
these conditions, Saad Uddin allowed Saifuddin to accept 
the position at Radio Kashmir, which temporarily resolved 
his financial problems. He noted however, that while he 
was to speak on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, he was 
told not to mention particular incidents that might rouse 
public sentiment, such as the Battle of Badr, a key battle in 
the early days of Islam, in which the Prophet’s community 
won against his opponents, the tribe of Quraysh, in Mecca. 
In the eyes of the officers at Radio Kashmir, perhaps 
speaking of a ‘Muslim victory’ over non-Muslims would 
raise sentiments against India in the region.    
When speaking to former bureaucrats, many of them 
reiterated that despite working in the bureaucracy, 
they had remained committed to empowering Kashmiri 
Muslims, and they had ‘no other options’ at the time. 
Some said that had Kashmiri Muslims not taken an active 
part in the bureaucracy, the government would have 
relied upon Indians from throughout the country, “who 
would not have had Kashmiris best interests at heart,” to 
formulate policy in the region (Interview with participant, 
Srinagar, 5 May 2014). Others stated that their jobs in the 
bureaucracy were apolitical and were simply for purposes 
of administering Kashmir. Ghulam Hassan Shah said that 
he “never did anything that would help the Government 
of India, so [he doesn’t] feel bad” (Interview with partic-
ipant, Srinagar, 12 June 2014). When Shah was in the 
Law Department, he maintained that he “translated and 
interpreted [the law] in ways that it would suit Kashmir… 
Never felt that I was doing what the Government of India 
wanted me to do” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 
12 June 2014). In this conversation, Shah mentioned an 
argument he had with Jagmohan, the infamous Governor 
of Kashmir, a few years before the militancy began. At the 
time, Shah was the Chairman of the Selection Board that 
hired individuals for various posts in the bureaucracy. He 
narrated that Jagmohan wanted him to hire more Kashmiri 
Pandits for various positions. Shah informed him that “90% 
of the community is Muslim, and therefore they should 
get 90% of the postings” (Interview with participant, 
Srinagar, 12 June 2014). As he remembered this incident, 
Shah stated that he had been afraid, but he told Jagmohan 
“to his face that he would not do anything that is wrong” 
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 12 June 2014). He 
speaks of this moment with pride, as he felt that he had 
not succumbed to or compromised on his principles in the 
face of an Indian Government official. As we will see in the 
conclusion, today’s bureaucrats in Kashmir repeat these 
justifications given for taking part in the post-Partition 
bureaucracy, although in a different political context than 
that of my respondents, but nonetheless underscoring the 
conflicting subjectivities that conflict societies produce. 
As most of my respondents explained, there were very few 
Kashmiri Muslims that were ‘Indians by heart’. Even those 
that were in the National Conference leadership, they 
stated, considered themselves Kashmiris first as being an 
‘Indian’ was a practical matter for them. Mushtaq Fazili, 
a retired engineer, who was sent by the government to 
study engineering in Bangalore, told me how he never 
identified as an Indian; he always identified as a Kashmiri 
Muslim. This is despite “religion not playing a big role 
in [his] family…more preference was given to education 
than going through rituals. The focus was on being a good 
human being” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 24 
August, 2014). The only group that fully aligned them-
selves with India, Mushtaq mentioned, were the Kashmiri 
Pandits. “They always said they were the true Indians” 
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 24 August, 2014). It 
is to the conflicted attitudes towards Kashmiri Pandits to 
which I turn next.
The voices that emerge from this section reflect the 
challenges of the early post-Partition period, and more 
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importantly, showcase the ways in which my respondents 
negotiated their everyday realities under Indian rule. 
These narratives trouble the ‘secular’ subjectivity that is 
usually associated with India as well as a ‘religious’ subjec-
tivity that is associated with Pakistan. Whether or not they 
viewed their decisions to participate in the state govern-
ment as a ‘compromise’ at the time, my respondents today 
express it as such, suggesting a greater sense of an ideo-
logical coherence over time. Almost all of my respondents 
recalled that people were anti-India, but participated in 
the state government and its institutions out of necessity. 
The desire to forge a Kashmiri Muslim subjectivity in the 
context of political uncertainty and contingency then 
remains an important insight gleaned from these narra-
tives. It is possible that the making of a Muslim subject 
was in response to accusations that these individuals were 
betraying the Kashmiri ‘cause’ and serving as ‘collab-
orators’. Therefore, the forging of a religiously-based 
subjectivity also reflected their heightened awareness of 
being complicit in government bureaucracy.   
On Kashmiri Pandits
Discussions of relations between Kashmiri Muslims and 
Kashmiri Pandits were fraught with a number of tensions. 
Nonetheless, they remained coherent in their descrip-
tion of similarities and personal friendships between 
members of the two communities, while at the same time 
denouncing what was seen as the Pandit’s allegiance 
to and ‘working for’ India at the expense of Kashmiri 
Muslims, which left a number of them to feel betrayed. 
This desire to assert one’s positive relations with Pandit 
neighbors, friends, and colleagues must be situated in the 
context of fraught tensions between the two communi-
ties today, a lingering impact from the militancy and the 
forced departure of a majority of the Pandit community 
outside of Kashmir. My respondents often tried to explain 
the absence of Pandits to me, and acutely reflected on the 
causes of the toxic relations today. 
Most of my respondents recalled how they respected and 
looked up to Kashmiri Pandits. Dr. Naseer mentioned how 
they were seen as being more cosmopolitan and educated 
than Kashmiri Muslims. Others mentioned how most of 
the good teachers were Kashmiri Pandits, as they were 
interested in their work, and the Muslim teachers ‘would 
not be as interested’. Many families would hire Pandit 
teachers to give their children tutoring in various subjects, 
and unlike the Muslim teachers, the “Pandit teacher would 
make sure that the students would understand the mate-
rial” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 17 November 
2013). Pirzada Hafizullah Makhdoomi, who was a Political 
Conference activist at the time, mentioned how Pandits 
were the seat of Kashmiri culture and language, “which 
is now dying after they left” (Interview with participant, 
Srinagar, 17 November 2013). Neerja Mattoo, the only 
Kashmiri Pandit I spoke to, recalled how the Pandit and 
Muslim bureaucrats would mix: “they all came from down-
town, were upwardly mobile, had a modern way of life. 
They were educated, lived in bungalows and brought land” 
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 24 May 2014). She 
had many Muslim friends, and they did not “even notice 
the difference,” she repeated a few times (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 24 May 2014). They would “watch 
films, wear the same clothes and hairstyles, and eat in 
each other’s homes” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 
24 May 2014). She clarified that the earlier generation 
would not eat together, but for her generation, it was 
‘not an issue’. Some Muslims also spoke of how Kashmiri 
Islam was unique because “we were originally Kashmiri 
Pandits…proud of the Sufi aspect of Kashmiri Islam which 
is mystical and draws upon Shaivism and Nund Rishi” 
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 17 November 2013). 
While earlier my respondents felt the need to assert a 
history of Kashmir that spoke directly to its Islamic past, 
when asked about Pandits, they unequivocally reiterated 
their important role in Kashmir’s cultural history,  
as well as the ‘Sufi aspect of Kashmiri Islam’. This  
suggests that my respondents did not seek to elide other 
communities from Kashmir’s history, but rather assert 
a Muslim identity that they felt was being erased from 
dominant narratives. 
Even those affiliated with Islamist politics, such as Qari 
Saifuddin, presented their relations with Pandits in 
Kashmir in a positive light. He saw Pandit officials as 
being honest, while the National Conference’s Muslim 
leaders were disingenuous. He mentioned how a Pandit 
lawyer, Jia Lal Chaudhary, defended him and others who 
were charged with engaging in a riot against the National 
Conference. At the same time, however, he noted his oppo-
sition to a cartoon that was printed in the paper, which 
showed the heads of the three main faiths in Kashmir—
Islam, Hinduism, and Sikhism— as being part of one body. 
Under the cartoon, it was written: “Naya (new) Kashmir 
will be religion of Kashmiris, they look three, but they all 
are one [sic]” (Saifuddin 1980: 33). Saifuddin said he found 
the statement to be intolerable:
Is new Kashmir to be the religion of Kashmir?… 
In the evening I made this sentence and cartoon 
my topic of speech. I emotionally criticized the 
new Kashmir and the maker of new Kashmir. The 
audience was silent because in this area, to be vo-
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cally angry on Kashmir’s leadership, it’s like a blast 
which rocked the whole area (Saifuddin 1980: 33).
Here, again, Saifuddin is expressing opposition to the 
state and its ideology of Kashmiriyat, that he sees as 
undermining Islam, not necessarily one that appears to be 
intolerant of other religions.
Despite the friendly relations between individual Muslim 
and Pandits, a number of my respondents referred to 
varying moments in recent history in which the relations 
between the two communities were challenged. M.A. Chisti 
described how 1931 played a pivotal role as that is when 
‘the uprising of Kashmiri Muslims had begun’. He stated:
There were a few incidents of misbehavior of Mus-
lims with their Hindu neighbors, though they were 
very few, some of the Pandit neighbors and those 
living in other Muslim majority areas, preferred 
to move to Pandit dominated areas. Then in 1947, 
when tribesmen attacked the Valley, they moved 
to other places, some of them even to neighboring 
Punjab and Delhi. In 1990, there was almost com-
plete exodus from the valley of Kashmiri Pandits. 
When they lived in the Valley though, Muslims 
had very good relations with them (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 27 February, 2014).
1947 was seen by some in a different light, however. As 
Ghulam Hassan Shah emotionally recalled, “Kashmiri 
Muslims protected all Hindus at the risk of their life…we 
can’t live without them. It didn’t even matter that they 
were all pro-Indian” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 
12 June 2014). Nonetheless, he added that the situation 
changed after 1947, as Pandits began to see themselves as 
‘Indian instead of Kashmiris’. Makhdoomi situated 1953 
as the turning point, as it became increasingly clear that 
“Pandits were for India, and Muslims were for Pakistan” 
(Interview with participant, Srinagar, 17 November 2013). 
Even the bastion of Kashmiriyat, Sheikh Abdullah, wrote 
in his autobiography that Kashmiri Pandits would use 
themselves as instruments of tyranny against the majority 
community, perhaps referring to a number of Kashmiri 
Pandits in Srinagar and in Delhi who were instrumental in 
his arrest (Abdullah 2013). Almost all said that the differing 
ideologies did not get in the way of their personal friend-
ships with Pandits, however.
Neerja Mattoo mentioned that some of the Hindus might 
have ‘resented’ the land reform acts, given that much 
of the landed aristocracy was Hindu, but that her father 
and his associates, who were involved in the National 
Conference, were happy to give up their land. According 
to her, resentment started building as more accommoda-
tion was made for Kashmiri Muslims in the schools and 
government bureaucracy. Zahid G. Muhammad described 
this as Kashmiri Pandits being “unable to reconcile to 
Kashmiri Muslims growing in society or accepting them 
as their equals” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 14 
November 2013). The last straw was when protests arose 
after a Kashmiri Pandit girl married a Muslim in the late 
sixties. Right-wing Hindu parties in India tried to exploit 
the situation, and the Kashmiri state government jailed 
and beat up a number of Pandit protestors. This was one of 
the turning points in the relationship between the  
two communities. 
When asked why the Pandits had left in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, a number of my respondents looked 
uncomfortable. One looked away and said, “They didn’t 
want to leave…but I can’t say much” (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 25 June 2014). Makhdoomi only said 
that he “had heartache when they left” (Interview with 
participant, Srinagar, 17 November 2013). Another former 
bureaucrat said that the Pandits were made to leave by 
Jagmohan’s government, who promised them that they 
would return once he had unleashed a brutal policy on 
Kashmiri Muslims.23 A few mentioned that the atmosphere 
in the Valley had become such that Pandits did not feel 
they would be safe. Yet, it is on this topic where a number 
of respondents were silent or did not respond at length. I 
suggest that this discomfort was registered as a result of 
feelings of both betrayal and guilt, and sadness at the state 
of affairs between the two communities today. The guilt 
was perhaps an acknowledgment of the ways in which 
Islamist discourses were elevated during the militancy, as 
calls for azadi (freedom) and a demand for nizam-e-mustafa 
(the order of the Prophet) rang from the mosques. Perhaps 
my respondents were aware of how this might have 
contributed to Pandit fears about their survival in Kashmir 
in that period. At the same time, many also felt betrayed, 
feeling that the Pandits “just left us here, without letting 
us know… it seemed they didn’t care what would happen to 
us under Jagmohan” (Interview with participant, Srinagar, 
12 June 2014). Whatever they felt about the causes for the 
departure of the Pandits, most agreed that the present 
generation in Kashmir suffered a loss, as they had grown 
up without ‘knowing any Pandits’.
My respondents affirmed that Kashmiri Pandits were an 
important part of Kashmir’s history, and that on some 
level there was a shared culture between the two commu-
nities. At the same time, they spoke to the changes that 
occurred between the two communities once Kashmiri 
Muslims were seen as being empowered. As a result of 
the political context in the state, on some level, a Muslim 
identity was being constructed in opposition to what was 
seen as a privileged Pandit one. 
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Conclusion
In this article, I have presented life narratives—both oral 
and written—of Kashmiri Muslims that lived through the 
early post-Partition period. The article helps situate how 
political subjectivities emerge in zones of conflict, war, 
and occupation. Political conflict produces paradoxical 
demands and aspirations that individuals are forced to 
reconcile. I conclude that it is through the creation of 
these paradoxical subjectivities that the state of conflict 
is sustained. Today, over 70 years after Partition, debates 
over collaboration and resistance, political aspirations 
and economic stability, continue in Kashmir as the past 
decade has witnessed the rise of a “new intifada” (Kak 
2011), which pits the current generation of Kashmiri 
youth against the brute force of the Indian state. Given 
the heightened forms of modern day surveillance, Indian 
militarization, as well as the use of state violence and the 
clamping down on any form of dissent, Kashmiris are 
once again forced to reconcile their desire for political 
freedom with their desire to lead ‘normal’ functional lives. 
With such restricted modes of political possibility made 
available to them, people continue to live their lives, as 
Gowhar Fazili articulates, “as occupied subjects [who] 
are constrained by circumstances to exist somewhere 
on the spectrum defined by resistance and collaboration 
and marked by a bit of both” (Fazili 2018: 206). The initial 
compromises made by the earlier post-Partition genera-
tion reflect on contemporary circumstances, as debates 
rage over the role of the Kashmiri bureaucrat or the police 
official who is seen as instrumental in the suppression of 
his or her own people. In particular, a number of  
Kashmiri Muslims have aspired to join the Indian civil 
services, including the case of Shah Faesal, who was 
pushed into the limelight for being the poster boy for the 
model that Kashmiri youth should aspire to (Huffington 
Post 2016). In a scathing critique for the Kashmir Reader, 
three Kashmiri youth argued, “these local henchmen of 
Indian occupation play a more pervasive role in helping 
to consolidate the illegal rule of India over the insurgent 
nation” (Dar et al. 2016).
Yet, these very same bureaucrats or police officials argue 
that they are serving their community and operating as an 
important buffer between the Indian state and its Kashmiri 
subjects, not unlike those among the post-Partition 
generation. Some have also insisted that their mandate 
is ‘mundane and miniscule’, and it is simply a job like any 
other job. As the piece in the Kashmir Reader continues, 
state collaborators argue that “their only job is to ‘sign 
papers’, ‘prepare budgets’, ‘manage the workforce’ or 
‘dole out orders’…the signature may approve a PSA (Public 
Safety Act) detention, a budget might be used to purchase 
weaponry, and the workforce could be a lethal group of 
child murderers” (Dar et al. 2016).
As debates rage, I suggest that the scope for collabora-
tion today is different than it was in the post-Partition 
period. The earlier generation lived in a period of multiple 
contingencies; they could not predict that India would 
erode Kashmir’s autonomy so unceremoniously and that 
the plebiscite would be rendered obsolete. They witnessed 
these processes taking place in their lifetimes; today’s 
generation has no such illusions. While the justifications 
the earlier generation had for its complicity may have 
held for that time, Kashmiri Muslims who are associated 
with the state today are confronted with an overt rebellion 
on a scale that the earlier generation never confronted. 
The changed conditions after the armed resistance, as 
the Indian state has made clear its mandate to completely 
obliterate any desire for self-determination through the 
destruction of lives and property, render this collaborative 
position wholly politically suspect. Furthermore, the rise 
of Hindutva in India has brought to fore the contradic-
tions under Nehruvian secularism and has devastating 
consequences for the Muslim-majority region. In sum, the 
difference between the early post-Partition period and the 
post-armed resistance period is that the earlier period was 
far more contingent. Today, that fluidity has all  
but disappeared.
Nonetheless, through the example of this post-Partition 
generation, I hope to demonstrate how local Kashmiris’ 
active involvement and agentive roles helped them to 
make sense of their world and create coherence out of 
disparity. They were not passive victims of the state; 
while these accounts certainly provide a sense of how 
the early Kashmir state government shaped Muslim 
identity, they also point to how a number of them made 
use of and benefited from institutional mechanisms in 
ways that made the most sense to them. These narratives 
help us think through political subjectivity as a process 
that occurs at the nexus of class, religion, and politics, in 
addition to individual personalities and subjectivities, and 
more importantly, that these subjectivities are shifting, in 
response to changing contexts.  
What these life narratives most clearly elucidate is the 
extent to which this class of Kashmiri Muslims contested 
the logic of the two nation-states, India and Pakistan, 
but were also subject to these dominant narratives. The 
overarching narratives of the Indian and Pakistani nation-
state and their respective nationalisms leave Kashmir, 
and Kashmiris, wanting. In treading the path of political 
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subjectivities in this period of nation-station formation, 
these life narratives allow us to envision a different collec-
tivity, one that foregrounds a Kashmiri Muslim-centric 
narrative that was formed through particular historical 
moments, such as the 1931 agitation and Sheikh Abdullah’s 
arrest in 1953. The encompassing Kashmiri Muslim collec-
tivity was a product of a repressive political context; at the 
same time, however, this article suggests that uncertainty 
and political repression created a rich environment for 
alternative and creative political imaginings. In sum, these 
life narratives represent the Kashmiri Muslim nostalgia  
for lost futures. 
 
Endnotes
1. A pheran is a type of shirt work by Kashmiri men and 
women. It is loose, reaches the knees and is often made of 
wool for the long winter months.
2. In this article, even though I am referring to the period 
after British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent, I use 
the term ‘post-Partition,’ instead of post-colonial or post-
independence, given the popular perception amongst most 
Kashmiri Muslims that there has been no post-colonial 
period in Kashmir as India remains a colonial power in 
Kashmir. In the same vein, Kashmiris believe that their 
land did not become independent as with the rest of the 
subcontinent; rather, it was occupied.
3. As the Indian subcontinent was divided into Muslim-
majority Pakistan and Hindu-majority India, Kashmir 
was one of the few princely states in which the religious 
identity of a majority of its population was different from 
the religious identity of its ruler, the Dogra Maharaja Hari 
Singh. As the Maharaja brutally squashed an uprising 
of Muslims in the region of Jammu, he sought military 
protection from India against a subsequent invading tribal 
raid from Pakistan who came to ‘liberate’ the regions 
Muslims. A murky transfer of sovereignty by the Maharaja 
led a majority of the territory to be incorporated into 
the Indian Union through a treaty of accession, which 
gave India control over the foreign affairs, defense, and 
communications of the region. The treaty promised that 
the state’s future would be determined ‘by a reference 
to the people.’ Both India and Pakistan went to war in 
1948, resulting in two-thirds of the former princely state 
to be controlled by India, which I refer to as Jammu and 
Kashmir, or alternatively, Indian-held Kashmir. One-third 
was controlled by Pakistan, which is referred to as Azad 
Kashmir or Pakistan-held Kashmir. While Indian-held 
Kashmir includes the region of Jammu, Ladakh, and the 
Kashmir Valley, I will primary be focusing on the Muslim-
majority Kashmir Valley, which remains the primary 
site of state violence and resistance against Indian rule. 
For brevity, I refer to this portion simply as ‘Kashmir.’ 
Kashmiri Muslims are a Kashmiri-speaking ethnic group 
that constitute a majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir. 
See Snedden, The Untold Story. 
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4. In 1931, Kashmiri Muslims began their agitation against 
the Dogras, a Hindu monarchy that governed Jammu and 
Kashmir as a princely state during the period of British 
colonial rule. They demanded democratic governance and 
better economic and educational rights, especially for the 
region’s marginalized Muslim community.
5. This provisionality is marked by multiple UN 
resolutions for plebiscite, as well as the cease-fire line, 
which situates Kashmir as a ‘dispute’. In the introduction 
to Resisting Occupation in Kashmir, the editors state, 
“Kashmir’s provisionality poses a threat to India’s identity 
as a secular and integrated nation…. It also enables India’s 
governance in the region, most notably through Article 
370 that establishes the terms of Kashmir’s relationship 
to India by granting a degree of autonomy to the state.” 
However, India has used Kashmir’s provisional status 
to maintain “a facade of democracy, the intentional 
framing of Kashmir as a dangerous border zone and 
threat to the integrity of the nation, and the continued 
implementation of laws of exception that establish 
the foundations for the intensive militarization and 
concomitant institutionalization of impunity in the 
region.” See Haley Duschinski et al, “Rebels of the Streets,” 
in Resisting Occupation in Kashmir (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2018) 15-17. 
6. I use the term ‘life narrative’ to refer to these sources, 
as it is a term that signals shifting self-referential practices 
in narratives that engage with the past, and reflect an 
identity in the present. Life narratives exist in a variety of 
diverse media and take the producer’s life as their subject. 
They allow for an understanding of the complex relations 
between public and official constructions of history 
and private recollections, a process that results in the 
constitution of ‘popular memory’. See Sidonie Smith and 
Julia Watson, Reading Autobiography: A Guide for Interpreting 
Life Narratives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
2010) 1; Mahua Sarkar, Visible Histories, Disappearing 
Women: Producing Muslim Womanhood in Late Colonial Bengal 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008) 134.
7. Unless directly referencing the Government of India, 
I use the term ‘state-led’ or ‘state government’ to refer 
to the Jammu and Kashmir state government, which was 
primarily at the helm of crafting state policies in this 
period although it received a vast majority of its funding 
from the Government of India.
8. During the armed resistance of the late eighties and 
the nineties, thousands of young Kashmiris went across 
the border into Pakistan to train and returned once more 
to fight against Indian rule. A vast majority of Kashmiri 
Pandits, the region’s Hindu minority, left the Kashmir 
Valley out of fear of a militancy that was increasingly 
inflected with Islamist discourses; some lived in camps in 
Jammu, while others lived in cities in India and abroad. 
During and in the aftermath of this iteration of the 
militancy, Kashmir became heavily militarized as over half 
a million Indian troops patrolled the region and bunkers 
and security zones arose in various neighborhoods. As 
a result, most of the narratives I gathered were deeply 
embroiled with this political present, as my respondents 
attempted to ‘explain’ or ‘understand’ contemporary 
Kashmir through their recollections of the past. Since 
2010, as a result of immense state violence and brutality 
against Kashmiri youth, a new generation of ‘home-grown’ 
militants has once again emerged. The numbers, however, 
remain in the hundreds, and have not yet reached the 
levels of three decades prior. 
9. Sheikh Abdullah was the first Prime Minister of the 
Jammu and Kashmir state. After initially supporting the 
state’s accession to India, he began to call for a plebiscite 
to determine the future of the region. On August 8, 1953, 
the Sheikh, who was heralded as the ‘Lion of Kashmir’ and 
had led the movement against the Dogras, was arrested 
and replaced by his Deputy Prime Minister, Bakshi Ghulam 
Mohammad, who was more amenable to the Government 
of India.  
10. I have obtained permission to share identifiers from 
my respondents.
11. The term Kashmiriyat refers to a shared, secular 
syncretic Kashmiri culture that was popularized by the 
post-Partition Jammu and Kashmir governments, in 
an attempt to both create a distinct Kashmiri cultural 
identity, but also ensure that the state’s accession to 
‘secular’ India would be solidified through the propagation 
of a secular Kashmiri identity.
12. While the National Conference officially stood for the 
ideals of secular nationalism, a number of scholars have 
noted that the party and its leadership, especially Sheikh 
Abdullah, did not hesitate to use religion for particular 
political ends. 
13. This is similar to the social base of the Muslim League 
in North India and urban Bengal.
14. Jinnah’s visit to Kashmir in 1944 was a critical 
moment in defining the National Conference’s alliance 
with the Indian National Congress. Jinnah was hosted by 
both parties—the National Conference and the Muslim 
Conference—but purportedly did not get along with 
Sheikh Abdullah, and during his speech to the Muslim 
Conference at Jamia Masjid, affirmed that they were the 
main representatives of Kashmiri Muslims, which angered 
the National Conference party leaders.
15. Their fears were not unsubstantiated, given the lack of 
land reform in Pakistan.
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16. For example, Anwar’s two brothers, who were against 
the National Conference, despite their father’s close ties 
with the Sheikh, went to Pakistan.
17. Chitrelekha Zutshi also makes this argument. See 
Zutshi, Languages of Belonging, 314.
18. After the Indian government installed Sheikh Abdullah 
as the Prime Minister, he was unceremoniously arrested 
and jailed, and replaced by his second-in-command, Bakshi 
Ghulam Mohammad. As the post-Partition period saw 
Kashmir slowly losing its autonomy under Indian rule, 
the Sheikh had begun to question the finality of Kashmir’s 
accession to India.
19. See, for example, Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: 
Jinnah, the Muslim League, and the Demand for Pakistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Farzana 
Shaikh, Community and Consensus in Islam: Muslim 
Representation in Colonial India 1860-1947 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989); Venkat Dhulipala, 
Creating a New Medina: State Power, Islam, and the Quest for 
Pakistan in Late Colonial North India (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2016).
20. This uncertainty has been referred to by a number of 
South Asian historians, including Neeti Nair. In her book, 
Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India, 
which contests essentialist understandings of Muslims 
and Hindus, Nair describes how none of her respondents, 
mostly Hindu refugees from Pakistan, believed that 
they would have to ‘leave forever’. This “‘moment of 
reckoning,’ the decision to leave their homeland for a new 
political configuration or nation lasted a few hours for 
some, several months for others… But the memory of the 
contingent quality of that decision to leave stayed,” she 
states. Similarly, Vazira Zamindar examines the contingent 
nature of defining citizenship, as people transversed 
borders, through passport regimes in the immediate 
post-partition period in India and Pakistan. See Neeti Nair, 
Changing Homelands: Hindu Politics and the Partition of India 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 220; Vazira 
Zamindar, The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South 
Asia: Refugees, Boundaries, Histories (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007).
21. My respondents used the term halaat to generally 
speak of the Kashmir conflict, and the political situation, 
whether it was referring to Naya Kashmir or in the 
contemporary period.  
22. Chisti was referring to the events of 1947, when the 
state massacred nearly two hundred thousand Jammu 
Muslims who had rebelled against Dogra rule.
23. Jagmohan was the controversial governor of the state 
during the crucial years of the militancy.
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